QUEST FOR PEACE
10: Taiwan a deal-breaker for US security
Henry C K Liu
Part 1: Two nations, worlds apart
Part 2: Cold War links Korea, Taiwan
Part 3: Korea: Wrong war, wrong place, wrong enemy
Part 4: 38th Parallel leads straight to Taiwan
Part 5: History of the Taiwan time bomb
Part 6: Forget reunification - nothing to reunite
Part 7: The referendum question
Part 8: Avoiding another no-win war
Part 9: Potential tragedy of miscalculation
This article appeared in AToL on
February 12, 2004
The United States argues that the terms and validity of the 1982
communique - one of three documents setting forth the terms of the
US-China-Taiwan relationship - depend upon assurances from the People's
Republic of China (PRC) to resolve "the Taiwan question" by peaceful
On July 14, 1982, the US gave Taiwan the Six Assurances that it:
Had not agreed to a
date for ending arms sales to Taiwan
<>Had not agreed to
hold prior consultations with the PRC regarding arms sales to the
Republic of China (ROC).
Would not play any mediation role between the PRC and the ROC. ><>Would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act.
Had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan. ><>Would not exert pressure on the ROC to enter into
negotiations with the PRC.
It has further been revealed in recent years that US president Ronald
Reagan also secretly assured Taipei that if Beijing ceased its
commitment to peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, the August
17, 1982, US-PRC communique would become null and void.
As is well known, the PRC has never rejected the use of force as an
option in resolving the Taiwan question, calling into dispute US good
faith in signing the 1982 communique while secretly assuring Taiwan of
a precondition. Moreover, the current US administration of President
George W Bush has declared that there should be no unilateral change in
the status quo by either party.
This policy entails three elements:
Taiwan should not declare independence.
><>Neither side should use
Taiwan's future should be resolved in a manner mutually agreeable to
the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
In addition, the US has said it does not "support" Taiwanese
independence. This means that Washington does not support Taiwanese
independence unless all the people on both sides of the Strait agree to
it, which in reality could mean never.
Bush flouts accord on Taiwan non-recognition
The Bush administration, in defiance of the basic precondition of
non-recognition of Taiwan for normalization of US-China relations, also
believes that Washington should maintain robust, albeit unofficial,
diplomatic relations with Taipei, on the grounds that peace across the
Taiwan Strait is an important US interest and Taiwanese actions,
especially provocative ones, fundamentally affect US interests. Regular
dialogue and contact with Taiwanese officials are rationalized as
necessary to improve communications and limit political surprises. This
is a flimsy excuse, since there are already adequate unofficial
channels of communication between Washington and Taipei without
ostentatious visits between government officials designed merely to
boost Taiwan's official status.
The Bush administration has been clear that it expects the parties on
both sides of the Strait to act responsibly in support of regional
stability, as if they were equal parties. Furthermore, Washington
continues to encourage dialogue between Beijing and Taipei on political
as well as security issues. This is in contradiction even to Reagan's
Six Assurances to Taipei, which maintained that the US would not play
any mediation role between the PRC and the ROC and would not exert
pressure on the ROC to enter into negotiations with the PRC.
The Bush administration also believes that the United States should
assist in finding opportunities for greater international
representation for Taiwan in such organizations as the World Health
Organization. Its argument for this belief is that it is the right
thing to do for the 22 million people of Taiwan, who deserve
representation in the international community, especially on issues
affecting their health, their economic welfare and the security of
their planes and ships. Another reason is that the less Taiwan feels
diplomatically isolated and the more it feels part of the international
community, the less likely it will be dissatisfied with the status quo
and the less likely to undertake provocative actions that could
undermine peace and stability across the Strait.
But China only opposes Taiwan's participation in international
organizations as an independent entity. Taiwan can participate in
international organizations the same way Hong Kong does, as a highly
autonomous part of China. But Taipei not only refuses to participate as
Taiwan, China, it is even beginning to decline the appellation of
Taiwan, Republic of China, and wants to be known only as Taiwan, thus
turning the issue to one of independence.
More US moral imperialism directed at China
Finally, US policy encourages political liberalization on the mainland
as the best hope for a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait
relationship. This of course is mere moral imperialism in the form of
peaceful evolution. Political developments in China will respond only
to internal Chinese needs, and are not undertaken to enhance US
geopolitical interests. This policy of moral imperialism unwittingly
has the counter-effect of deterring political liberalization in China
by casting it as a movement against Chinese national interests.
Last June 1, Bush discussed Taiwan with Chinese President Hu Jintao on
the sidelines of the Group of Eight summit of industrialized nations in
France. In a press briefing later that day, a senior Bush
administration official described Bush's comments, triggering
speculation on whether US policy toward Taiwan had changed. Within a
few days both Taiwan's cabinet spokesman Lin Chia-lung and American
Institute in Taiwan chair Therese Shaheen said there had been no
harmful change in US policy toward Taiwan.
On the other hand, the People's Daily noted on June 13 that after
deviating from the policy of the previous six US administrations,
Bush's Taiwan policy had now moved back to the mainstream. It described
Bush's "non-support" as "opposition" to Taiwan independence and aligned
the United Stats' "one-China policy" more closely with Beijing's "one
China principle". Without directly correcting the Chinese
interpretation, the same US senior official said: "On Taiwan, the
president repeated our policy of a 'one China' policy based on the
three communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act [TRA], no support for
Taiwan independence ... The president also said ... if necessary, we
will help Taiwan to the extent possible to defend itself."
Bush's remarks were widely interpreted as a softening in US support for
Taiwan. This was the first time "no support for Taiwan's independence"
had been elevated to the level of the TRA and the three communiques,
and Bush did not mention peaceful resolution with the assent of the
people on Taiwan. The April 2001 Bush promise of "whatever it took" to
help defend Taiwan, committing the United States to maximum effort in
Taiwan's defense, was replaced with the new wording, "If necessary, we
will help Taiwan to the extent possible to defend itself" with two
qualifications. The phrase "if necessary" is superfluous if it simply
means "if China were to attack Taiwan" because US intervention
presupposes Chinese military aggression. There is little question that
if the People's Liberation Army (PLA) were to launch a blitzkrieg
against Taiwan, the island could not alone repel the invading forces.
Taiwan would clearly need US assistance. China has always insisted on
its right to the force option on the independence issue. Beijing in
fact has put a still-unspecified time limit on peaceful resolution by
warnings of military action if Taiwan refuses to acknowledge Chinese
sovereignty indefinitely. The qualifying phrase "if necessary" can be
interpreted as a US hedging against Taipei's opting unilaterally to
make accommodations with Beijing. Similarly, the phrase "to the extent
possible" could be a hedge against the eventuality of Taiwan's
leadership caving in to PLA actions so quickly that US intervention
would make no difference.
Would Taiwan really fight for independence?
Although not publicly acknowledged, Washington is reported to be
steadily losing confidence in Taiwan's resolve to fight for its
survival as a de facto independent nation. With economic integration
with the mainland, Taiwan's economy is increasingly dependent on the
motherland. Because of massive outflow of capital, technology and
people from Taiwan to the mainland, the Taiwanese economy is being
hollowed out of manufacturing. And yet all the island's political
parties are intent on early implementation of direct links, further
weakening Taiwan's desire for political independence and US-backed
After a US B-2 (mistakenly, the United States said) bombed the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 during the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization military action in Kosovo, the administration of president
Bill Clinton worked to rebuild its relationship with the PRC. Taiwan
"president" Lee Teng-hui's July 9 statement that Taiwan and China
should deal with each other on a "special state-to-state" basis upset
the US State Department. While Washington and Beijing have restored
some momentum to their bilateral ties with a landmark agreement on
China's entry into the World Trade Organization, the relationship
between Washington and Taipei continues to drift.
Lee's "state-to-state" announcement created serious strains between
Taiwan and the United States. His provocative statement, so soon after
the embassy bombing, could not have come at a more sensitive time for
Washington, which viewed Lee's behavior as reckless. The Clinton
administration delayed a trip to Taiwan by a Pentagon delegation and
leaked to the media the possible scaling back of deliveries of F-16
spare parts, sending a clear signal that Taiwan could not go too far
down the "state-to-state" road without risking its security ties to the
US. Even some of Taiwan's longtime supporters in Congress criticized
Lee's remarks as being unhelpful.
In June 1998, Clinton publicly stated the "Three Nos": ><>No support for Taiwan independence.
No support for "two Chinas".
><>No support for Taiwan's
participation in state-based international organizations.
Taiwan also sensed US pressure for an interim arrangement whereby
Taipei would agree not to declare independence in exchange for
Beijing's pledge not to use force. Faced with these developments, Lee
chose to assert that Taiwan was already an independent, sovereign state
and Beijing and Washington needed to deal with this reality.
Nevertheless, it is a de facto sovereignty that depends directly on the
US skirting official non-recognition of Taiwan.
Cross-Strait status quo unacceptable to Beijing
The interim agreement proposals from US academics and officials
actually fanned misunderstanding. Assistant secretary of state Stanley
Roth and other US diplomats suggested that an interim agreement might
be useful for improving cross-Strait relations, in the spirit of buying
time and stabilizing the status quo. But the status quo was a
continuing state fundamentally unacceptable to Beijing.
Lee's "state-to-state" announcement was coached by Republican China
hand James Lilley, a former Central Intelligence Agency director with
close ties to Taiwan and former ambassador to China in the
administration of president George H W Bush, in order to give the
Clinton administration a diplomatic headache - and it went further than
a declaration of "independence". In alluding to the German model of
reunification, Lee identified Taiwan with West Germany, reuniting with
a poorer and less developed mainland, as East Germany.
Taiwan realizes that it will need to enter into political discussion
with the Beijing government sooner or later and the "state-to-state"
formula is a strategy to reject Beijing's idea that it is merely a
province. Meanwhile, as Beijing insists on Taiwan being a Chinese
province, Taipei insists on being an independent state.
Taiwan's adoption of a "state-to-state" formula was triggered by a
perceived softening of US support as the Clinton administration in its
second term became more receptive to China's "one country, two systems"
formula, as applied to Hong Kong, as a possible solution to the Taiwan
issue. Taiwan's state-to-state formulation, in turn, increased US
annoyance at Taipei acting as an unwelcome obstacle to US global
geopolitical strategy that requires Chinese cooperation. Washington's
desire to restrain Taipei's provocative behavior fueled Taiwan's
anxieties, and caused Taipei to exert increasing independence even from
Washington with the support of the right wing in US domestic politics.
"Selling out Taiwan" became a campaign issue in the 2000 presidential
The Bush administration's robust support of Taiwan has been diluted
primarily because of Taipei's failure to commit unequivocally to
non-provocative acceptance of the status quo and secondarily because of
America's need to elicit China's help in fighting global terror after
September 11, 2001, in resolving the North Korean nuclear standoff, and
in supporting (or not opposing) the United States on Iraq in the United
Nations Security Council. This shift in the US stance is tactical,
however, rather than strategic. The US still perceives geopolitical
interests in maintaining the status quo on Taiwan. The recent
appointment of Princeton professor and prominent sinologist Aaron
Friedberg to the post of deputy national security adviser and director
of policy planning on Vice President Dick Cheney's staff tends to
support this interpretation (see The Struggle for Harmony Part
1: Myths and realities about China, June 13, 2003, and Part
2: Imagined danger, June 14).
Some see inevitable US-China confrontation
Friedberg sees potential long-term dangers that a
modernized PLA may pose to US security and has written about the
inevitability of a US-China confrontation. After the September 11,
2001. attacks, world geopolitics has become highly volatile. The
US-Taiwan relationship is not exempt from the dynamics of changing
international relations. After a private meeting in the White House
with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao last December 11, during Wen's state
visit, Bush told the press: "We oppose any unilateral decision by
either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. The comments and
actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to
make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose."
Thus "oppose" has officially replaced "non-support" for Taiwan
The area of converging US-Taiwan interests is shrinking because of
changing geopolitics. The single most important consideration remaining
is US concern that allowing Taiwan to fall back into the arms of the
PRC by force or coercion could prove detrimental to US leadership in
East Asia, particularly in terms of security arrangements with US
allies, especially Japan and South Korea. Yet the test of maintaining
security is in US diplomatic skill in avoiding war, not its war-winning
capability. US allies in East Asia know that while a victory in war may
protect US prestige, it would nevertheless leave their respective
countries in ruins.
Such war-deterring diplomatic skill requires yielding to China on
issues of its fundamental and vital national interest, such as the
issue of Taiwan. Taiwan is a deal-breaking issue, as the American
saying goes. Pushing the Taiwan issue to a military solution would
represent a massive failure of US diplomacy in Asia. Even if the US 7th
Fleet with its two carrier groups and the overwhelming force-projection
capabilities from US bases in Japan should manage to thwart a PLA
invasion of Taiwan, the Taiwan that was left after the bomb smoke
clears would not resemble anything worth defending. On the other hand,
even if China should succeed in regaining Taiwan through military
conquest, the gain of a war-torn economy would be a Pyrrhic victory.
The Taiwan issue is a political issue, and all parties agree that it
needs to be solved with political accommodation. Yet political options
exist only within limits. Failure to exercise political options will
lead to war. Clausewitzian concepts of war notwithstanding, war is not
diplomacy by other means (Karl von Clausewitz, a Prussian military
officer, wrote on military strategy). War is the product of failed
diplomacy. The legacy of war is international hatred that fuels future
wars while the legacy of diplomacy is international harmony that fuels
stability. A war over the Taiwan Strait has no winners. All will lose
more than they hope to gain.